might rationally design a fundamental foreign-policy governance framework for an anarchic world inhabited by greater powers and subject to realist rules of war, we would have a reliable blueprint of the original foreign affairs Constitution. The blueprint would be a new and useful tool for resolving controversies about the original public meanings of important constitutional provisions relating to foreign parties given ambiguous text and historical evidence. The second-and secondary-aim of this Essay is to address the present-day relevance of the explanatory leverage afforded by international relations theory into the meaning of the original foreign affairs Constitution.
The implications of the international relations context at the founding for constitutional interpretation have been largely ignored. 12 Indeed, in general, although domestic political theory informs discussion of what the Constitution meant at the time of ratification and should mean today, no one thinks to look to international relations theory for insight into original-or contemporary-constitutional meanings. Put another way, when we ask ourselves what constitutions are for, the near-universal response is that they are for protecting our individual rights and ensuring democratic government. To be sure, the domestic political ends of rights and democracy for the American people were important constitutional goals, but, as a historical matter, the Constitution of the United
States was first and foremost about achieving the survival of a new revolutionary nation in a dangerous world order-a condition antecedent to the enjoyment of individual rights or democracy. On this view, the institution of the national judiciary, insofar as its power of judicial review makes it the ultimate arbiter of constitutional meaning, was intended to be a foreign-policy and national-security institution, 13 a point that gets overlooked today when debates about the separation of powers in foreign affairs focus principally on the executive and legislative branches. My methodological aim in this Essay is to introduce the idea that theorizing about the Constitution, at least as it pertains to foreign affairs, belongs as much to the world of international political theory as it is the domain of domestic political philosophers.
This Essay has three parts. The first part theorizes how weaker states generally behave in a realist world order populated by more powerful states and demonstrates the fit of the weak-state perspective to the United States' world standing at founding. The second shifts from political science to law to explore the specific implications of the Framers' original weak-state perspective for the U.S. foreign affairs Constitution. The third addresses the apparent incongruity of applying an original constitutional framework for foreign affairs designed for a weak state in 1789 when the United States has become a hegemonic power in 2007.
I. Theorizing the Militarily Weak State's Foreign Policy Preferences
For the most part, international relations (IR) theory concerns itself with great powers. But there is a small, insightful body of scholarship that deals with the peculiar case of the weak state. 14 The corpus arose in the context of the Cold War, when the 13 Casto and Goebel have made this point from a strictly historical perspective. 14 Bibliography of weak state literature. All of this discussion assumes a rational-actor model of weak state behavior. One of the most interesting parts of the weak-state literature deals with "rogue" weak states like North Korea who act in ways that seem to defy the standard rational-choice model. Because, in my view, paradoxical influence of weak states on world politics (the "tail wagging the dog" phenomenon) presented an interesting puzzle for IR scholars.
A threshold question the literature confronted was definition. In a classic work, Robert Rothstein defined a "Small Power" as:
A state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognized by the other states involved in international politics. Keohane's approach was characteristically more functional, phrased in terms of the weak state's capacity to make "some" or a "significant" "impact" on the international system.
This may include more than the mere ability to survive, although I would think that at the very least "some" impact means persuading more powerful states with designs to attack it to leave it alone or to survive such an attack if persuasion fails. What Keohane is clear on is that the leaders of what he called "middle" or "small" powers perceived they must act in a "a small group" or through an "international institution" if they are to have even a chance at exercising an impact on the world order. 20 The extent to which a particular state will choose one strategy over the other or a mix of the two will depend to a large extent on its ex ante power capacity.
By virtue of its military infirmity, a weak state is by definition constrained in its capacity to balance internally by self-help. This condition has two logical consequences.
First, the weak state will place a higher premium on avoiding wars-and maintaining peaceful relations-with foreign states than the great power. It will therefore seek to mitigate potential reasons for foreign states, especially those it perceives to be great powers, to wage war against it and avail itself of mechanisms to restore peace quickly in the event of war. In other words, it will make maximal use of peaceful conflictresolution devices such as negotiating peace treaties and establishing tribunals to settle international disputes short of war, and it will adhere to the legal norms of the international community of nations in order to diminish the possibility that violations of those norms could be used as a reason for war against it. Second, the weak state should be more hospitable to alliances and other techniques of external balancing to compensate for its deficiencies in internal balancing.
But the weak state's preferences with respect to alliances are more complicated than the simple first logical cut would suggest. Alliances with great powers are a particularly tricky means of external balancing for weak states. As a general matter, alliances entail the forfeiture of some measure of a state's independence of action and so present a less attractive option than internal balancing, all other things being equal.
Additionally, "bandwagoning" 21 with an ascendant great power that ends up victorious in great-power conflict may result in benefits for the weak state's standing in the world order, but it may also increase the satellite dependence of the weak state on the great power. But "chain-ganging" in an alliance with an ultimate loser in great-power conflict might have the opposite effect, and possibly even result in the destruction of the weak state. It is hard to tell in advance whether an alliance decision will result in bandwagoning or chain-ganging. The weak state that finds itself in the middle of a bipolar or multipolar conflict among great powers must therefore walk a fine line among the great powers. Rather than ally with one or another great power given the risks of 20 See generally Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987) . 21 Christensen and Snyder, Chain-ganging and Bandwagoning in Alliances.
chain-ganging despite the potential benefits of bandwagoning, the weak state might rationally seek to maintain neutrality.
22
Another option besides neutrality for the weak state given the difficulties inherent in alliance with a great power is an alliance or confederation with one or more other weak states in a collective security institution. The great risk in this strategy is that the constituent states are so weak than even an aggregation of their military power would not suffice to deter or balance a great-power threat. To maximize the aggregation would likely require centralized coordination of military forces and important foreign policy decisions, in order to restrain defections to the enemy, disputes among state members of the alliance, and overly aggressive behavior by some states.
In the event that prevention tactics fail and a weak state is drawn into great-power conflict in a realist world order, it will seek a path to peace as soon as possible. By definition, the weak state has a more modest interest in simply maintaining a status quo in which it continues to exist as a sovereign entity, which differs from a great power that is plausibly more interested in maintaining and aggrandizing its power vis-à-vis other great In summary, we can theorize several distinctive features of the foreign affairs constitution of a militarily weak state facing great-power threats in a realist world order with permissive rules on war, by contrast to the present world order's blanket prohibition on wars other than for self-defense or with United Nations sanction. The constitution will favor judicial (whether by domestic or international tribunals) and diplomatic resolution of disputes with foreign parties to prevent resort to war by the other side.
Second, the constitution will make it difficult for the state's leaders to wage offensive war, particularly against great powers, but easier to wage defensive war in cases of invasion where territorial integrity or sovereignty are threatened. By the same token, we can theorize that the constitution will try to make it as easy as possible for state leaders to terminate wars. Fourth, the constitution will permit resort to multilateral alliances for external balancing, although it will seek to provide safeguards against the chain-ganging and bandwagoning risks of alliances with great powers. Fifth, the constitution will seek to maximize the state's compliance with international law (the paradigmatic case being a peace treaty with a great power) to alleviate the possibility that a violation of international law will give a great power a reason to wage war against it. Sixth, the constitution will restrict the state's ability to cede its own territory or to give up sovereign rights, for instance by treaties affording extraterritorial rights to foreigners. Finally, and as a general matter, given the militarily weak state's basic (and sole) interest in a
Hobbesian universe populated by more powerful states is to be left alone to live, it will seek continuance of the status quo by contrast to great powers for whom realists predict a constant struggle for relative gains in power against each other.
Having sketched a model foreign-policy constitution based on the reasonable preferences of a militarily weak state in the face of great-power threat, it remains to be seen if the United States was in fact such a state at the time the Constitution was framed.
The case in chief begins with the genesis of the Constitution itself as the charter for a "more perfect union" of the former colonies to aggregate military power in the wake of the proven infirmities of the Articles of Confederation in this regard. The foundational act of constitutional bonding-functionally an alliance of thirteen weak states-was a reaction to a world order perceived to be hostile to the survival of the American states as independent sovereigns. And the threat was perceived as sufficiently severe that the people of the respective states were ultimately willing to submit to a complete surrender of "external" sovereignty, roughly corresponding to the province of the foreign affairs constitution, to a newly formed general government.
The life-or-death threat that the infant United States faced was of interlaced domestic and foreign complexion. The instant concern was the fracture of the "compound republic" 24 into its constituent semi-autonomous states. The several states on their own would be easy pickings for the European great powers whose lands and armies and navies virtually encircled the new republic. First and foremost of these was Great Britain, which retained control of Canada and its Caribbean colonies. Spain claimed ownership of Florida, everything west of the Mississippi River, the river itself, and a good chunk east of it too. France still had colonies in the West Indies and was thought to covet Spanish Louisiana. The prospects of renewed war, a trade embargo, or a cut-off of credit were no idle threats. American trade and early nationalism, it was of negligible effect on the world order, and so entirely consistent with the profile of a militarily weak state.
To be sure, the framers understood that their new Republic possessed great natural resources and many among them envisioned that the United States would one day be a great nation. But they did not necessarily desire or envision that the United States would be a "great power" in the classical world order, that is, a country that would have sufficient military power to project abroad and influence global politics. Rather, they dreamed of the future United States as "a great nation" apart that would forever remain a "weak state" in IR terms, that is, a state that would have no ability (or desire) to affect the world order beyond the self-defense capacity to ensure its own survival.
II. How the U.S. Constitution Reflects the Militarily Weak State in a Hobbesian World Order
We know well the constitutional protections the That is to say, they ignore the possibility that the international relations context at the founding shaped the foreign affairs Constitution. Indeed, the far more common move, by both conservative and progressive scholars, is to presume the exact opposite -that the foreign affairs Constitution is largely modeled on the contemporaneous constitution of the British Empire, the most powerful state in the late eighteenth century world balance.
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There are two major reasons for this neglect. The constitutional text does yield important clues about the Framers' weak-state perspective on contemporaneous international relations. For instance, the aforementioned concessions to federalism are nowhere to be found with respect to foreign affairs: the Constitution denies to the states the most awesome powers in the foreign-policy toolbox of the day such as the powers to make war, to issue letters of marque, to enter alliances, and to make treaties. These powers are vested instead in the newly created general government. Banding together to aggregate power and to coordinate a single foreign policy-and thereby to restrain at one blow both more belligerent and more timid member states-is a classic strategy of political unions who see themselves as weak in the face of militarily powerful foreign threats, as witness the mid-nineteenth century unification of German states to counterbalance French strength.
Ironically, a mere 70 years after the founding, the Union had become so much a force to be reckoned with in world politics that the same European powers who had taken opposite sides in the American revolutionary war sought Confederate victory for the global balance-of-power implications of a retrograde cleavage of the United States.
Consider also that the power to initiate offensive war is committed to Congress, the most democratically accountable national governance institution, but the direct power to terminate such wars -permanently by treaty or temporarily by armistice-is committed to the less democratically accountable Senate and the President jointly, and to the President as Commander-in-Chief, respectively. 32 Scholars have argued that the Framers vested the declare-war power in Congress because of the fear that a President might wage war for personal glory against the interests of the citizens who would pay for the war and fight and die in its battles. 33 In other words, the assignment of the declarewar power to Congress was, in functional terms, a conflict-avoidance mechanism. To be 31 Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Constitution, 13 (2d ed. 1996) . 32 Congress also has the implicit power to terminate wars by cutting off funding for military forces.
sure, this arrangement is mainly-and more commonly-justified from a domestic political standpoint as a protection for citizens, but it is also consistent -as Immanuel But not all treaties are created equal for the militarily weak state. Peace treaties, so long as they do not cede territory or autonomy are of especial high value, and so it is important that the constitutional framework permit their ratification, even when they run against democratic sentiments. Treaties of amity and commerce that establish peaceful relations with other sovereign states are also beneficial. But treaties of alliance-beyond the foundational "alliance" of the thirteen quasi-sovereign former colonies-are possibly detrimental because of the risks of bandwagoning and chain-ganging.
The upshot is that a militarily weak state has an interest in preempting democratic impulses in ratifying treaties of peace and amity and commerce and for making sure that it doesn't break treaties, since a breach of a treaty supplied a lawful reason to wage war against the party in breach. Hence, the President may treat with the advice and consent of A third controversial topic in modern U.S. foreign relations law is the constitutionality of delegation of judicial Article III functions and legislative Article I functions to multilateral institutions. On the weak state view, there is nothing particularly objectionable about such delegations: the former might be more favored than the latter given their usefulness in resolving international controversies, but the latter also seems unproblematic so long as the multilateral legislation does not result in the cession of territory or other essential attributes of sovereignty.
A related modern controversy is the incorporation of foreign and international legal standards into U.S. domestic constitutional law. Applying the weak-state perspective, it doesn't seem like there is any constitutional problem with this so long as the foreign or international standard is higher than the American standard. This is because in the brutal world legal order that pertained in the late eighteenth century, if an alien were "denied justice" by having been judged under U.S. legal norms that departed from general international customary standards, the alien's sovereign had the right to wage war against the United States. Given this rule, it is hard to imagine that the 
III. Translating the Foreign Affairs Constitution
If A second sort of non-originalist justification would be to accept the ancient framework because it is likely a better solution to a structural problem that has endured in essential respects notwithstanding the growth of American power. The world community has grown to a truly global dimension and international law has come to embrace the idea of individual human rights and restrictions on aggressive war, but the sovereign state remains the principal actor on the international stage and the international governance institutions that have been developed are a far cry from a world government. And, if one were to discount the importance of a state's relative standing in the world, it seems fair to conclude that the framers thought more carefully about how to ensure national flourishing and security in the context of a hostile world order than the leaders of a presently hegemonic state might.
The thitrd sort of justification is pragmatic. To wit, it so happens that the weakstate foreign affairs Constitution is a good fit for a hegemon, although it would not be such a good fit for a super power or a great power. This is so because a weak state's basic interest vis-à-vis the rest of the world is to maintain its status quo position in the world, preserve peace, and to avoid sovereign-to-sovereign armed conflict. It does not seek to change the fundamental rules of the world order because it cannot in fact alter them. Ironically, a hegemon also does not seek fundamental changes to underlying rules even though it assuredly could because it has successfully resorted to them to attain hegemony. A good example of this counter-intuitive confluence would be to consider the presumption of self-executing treaties. A military weak state would prefer self-executing treaties because it does not want to run the risk of breaching a treaty with a greater power by failing to enact implementing legislation. By contrast, a great or super power is more comfortable with breaching by failing to enact implement legislation if it perceives the possibility of a relative power gain. However, a hegemon, by definition, has asymmetric bargaining power to dictate the terms of a treaty, and so it bears no costs by making the originalist I know makes such a claim, for making it to win this battle would necessarily concede the entire purpose of a backward-looking mode of constitutional interpretation.
treaty self-executing, since it can be assumed that treaty terms favor the hegemon. It is important to qualify that this will not necessarily be true as to treaties concerning subjects in which the hegemon does not have hegemonic power. To give an example, a military hegemon like the United States can be assumed to be able to dictate favorable terms with respect to treaties of alliance or peace to end a war, but not with respect to, for instance, economic treatise where U.S. power is not as pronounced.
Conclusion
Because the United States was a weak state in the global balance of power at the founding, the Constitution naturally reflects a weak state's perspective on the appropriate framework for the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. And, importantly, because that framework was not renovated in the way the constitutional rules of federalism and individual rights were revised by the Civil War Amendments, there is no plausible textual basis on which to tack a sea change in the foreign affairs Constitution to track the dramatic rise in the United States' global standing. On its face this incongruity provides a profound new reason to reject originalism as an interpretive theory of the foreign affairs Constitution: a constitutional framework for foreign policy designed to cope with a world of more powerful states in 1789 seems inapt for a hegemonic power in 2007. Thus, it appears at first glance that original intent as applied to the foreign affairs Constitution may be criticized on the same abstract basis of changed circumstances that is a principal critique of using original intent to construe the domestic affairs Constitution.
But the two instances are different. It is hard to deny that a late eighteenth century system of constitutional rules pertaining to individual rights and federalism premised on the belief that political power does and should rest with propertied white men (with the right to own black slaves) whose first loyalty is to their states does not fit the twenty-first century United States. And intervening constitutional amendments explicitly modified the original rules. However, a web of constitutional rules for foreign policy that brakes the executive's -or any other national political branch's-use of armed force, authorizes multilateral cooperation, promotes adherence to international law, and permits and indeed encourages the deployment of the judiciary in sensitive national security issues may be as sound now in a unipolar setting where the principal foreign threat is a diffuse non-state terrorist group with potential access to weapons of mass destruction that is relatively immune to conventional military power, as it was in the context of a minor power seeking to survive in a world of multiple great powers. Put another way, a constitutional framework for international relations with a status-quo peace orientation may be as valid a strategy for a nation that dominates the world order as it is for a nation that lacks the capacity to influence it.
It bears noting that the same scheme may not be suited to a highly competitive multipolar or bipolar world order where the key threats to national security are other powerful states with commensurate military power. In other words, a foreign-policy governance structure tailored to the geopolitical context of the late eighteenth United
States is pragmatically well suited to the twenty-first century United States, although it may not have been the right fit for the United States of the mid-to-late twentieth century
